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pathologization survive. It must be eradicated in order
to move American society forward into the next step in
race relations.
Christina Forst is currently a junior History major
and Philosophy minor with a Pre-Law emphasis.  This
past spring, she presented this paper at the Northern
California Phi Alpha Theta conference.  After gradua-
tion, Christina plans on attending law school.
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A Policy of Rock: How Rock and Roll
Undermined the Communist Revolution
in Cold War Russia
Neal Albright
“Capitalism was the engine of rock’s develop-
ment as a global cultural phenomenon.”1
Today, we know how the story of the Soviet Union
ends. In 1921, however, at the end of four years of
bitter civil war, the future seemed limitless, and
Vladimir Lenin was prepared to take full advantage of
it. Lenin’s ultimate goals went further than simple
competent governance. His party, the Bolsheviks, “took
power with an extraordinarily ambitious program
aimed...at remaking humanity.”2
As the civil war wound down and Bolshevik victory
appeared imminent, Lenin turned his attentions to
catalyzing a Russian economic recovery in the wake of
four tumultuous and destructive years. In line with his
vision for a worldwide Socialist revolution, Lenin
sought to modernize Russia into a twentieth century
power. Observing the newly ascendent great power in
the West, Lenin came to the conclusion that America’s
success lay in its technological achievements, espe-
cially in its innovative uses of electricity. By co-opting
the American focus on technological modernity, Lenin
       Thomas Cushman, Notes from the Underground (New1
York: Albany State University of New York Press 1995), 19.
       Peter Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from Beginning to2
End (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 30.
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believed that Russia could become an even greater
power. As he famously asserted, “Communism = Soviet
power + electrification.”3
Moreover, modern industry and the electricity it
relied on would also be crucial to achieving Lenin’s
predicted Communist apotheosis. In a 1920 speech, he
declared that "...the organization of industry on the
basis of modern, advanced technology, on electrifica-
tion...will put an end to the division between town and
country, will make it possible to raise the level of
culture in the countryside and to overcome, even in
the most remote corners of land, backwardness,
ignorance, poverty, disease, and barbarism."  Lenin4
stressed that “industry cannot be developed without
electrification.” Consequently, “without reconstruction
of industry on lines of large-scale machine production,
socialist construction will obviously remain only a set
of decrees.”  Throughout its seventy years of existence,5
this theme of technological and industrial modernity
remained central not only to the USSR’s national
goals, but also to its core ideology.
Lenin died in 1924 predicting a coming global
Socialist revolution, with urban industrialization and
technological prowess as its catalysts. Perhaps he
foresaw automobiles replacing horses for personal
transport, nuclear weapons threatening the very
existence of humanity, or communication technology
connecting the planet on an unprecedented scale.
However, it is unlikely that the brilliant Socialist could
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augur the circumstances wherein, thirty years later
and across the world in the United States, a generation
of young musicians would plug electricity into guitars
and subsequently popularize a new form of music that
would in turn emigrate throughout the world, includ-
ing into Lenin’s oft-purged Soviet Union. He could not
know that this music would then collectivize societal
discontent and contribute to the eventual fall of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The grand Com-
munist apotheosis, achievable only with technological
modernity, would be undone, in part, by the technol-
ogy that enabled the loud, electric musical stylings of
dissatisfied, bored, and rock and roll-obsessed kids. 
In the twenty years since the dissolution of the
USSR and end of the Cold War, an array of both Soviet
and American scholars have studied the effects of
Western rock and roll music on  Soviet government
policy and on the daily lives of Soviet citizens.  These
scholars generally agree that rock and roll music held
a significant role in both improving the standing of
America and the West in the minds of Soviet citizens
while also distracting from and undermining Commu-
nist ideology. Furthermore, a broad consensus
emerges throughout Soviet rock studies that the
popularity of Western culture contributed to a cultural
rebellion that, by its inherent nature, was at odds with
Soviet policy and ideology. 
Scholars disagree about the exact nature of this
revolt. Thomas Cushman argues that rock music
created a Russian counterculture which actively
protested against Soviet policies, akin to the American
counterculture of the 1960s. In contrast, Alexei
Yurchak writes that rock and roll merely created a
political apathy among the youth, resulting in an
2
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active disinterest and withdrawal from Communism
and its tenets. In a country founded predominantly
upon the ideal of a citizenry united in solidarity within
Socialism, such a profound disconnect would therefore
be fatal to the authority of the State’s social contract
between citizen and government.
This paper argues that the concept of technological
modernity was central to Soviet Communist ideology
and intertwined with the rock and roll explosion of the
latter half of the 20th century. In interesting and ironic
ways, serving to undermine its own legitimacy, the
Soviet government inadvertently instigated and perpet-
uated rock and roll awareness, and its harsh reflection
on Soviet society. By seeking to contain the ideological
power of rock and roll, the regime implicitly acknowl-
edged the techno-superiority of the West. In the end,
rock and roll and its related technologies confirmed
what most Soviets already suspected: the West had
won the war of technological modernity.6
1957-1964: Krushchev, De-Stalinization, and a
Single Voice
Blank tape was hard to find, but the stores had
plenty of tapes with old Revolutionary anthems
in stock...on my tapes you could hear bursts of
the Red Army Choir between the sides of Sticky
Fingers.7
Magnitizdat
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In 1953, Joseph Stalin suffered a stroke and soon
after died.  Hundreds of thousands packed Moscow’s
public areas, jostling for the chance to view his dis-
played corpse. Stalin had institutionalized a state
system whose key tenets included mass murder,
forced collectivization, and omnipresent secret police.
It was also the only life many Soviet people had ever
known, and Stalin’s death evoked a deep and uncer-
tain anxiety about the future.8
Nikita Khrushchev emerged victorious amid the
chaotic power struggle to succeed the dictator.
Khrushchev became what Soviet historian Peter Kenez
described as, “the last Soviet leader with a firm belief
in the superiority of the Marxist-Leninist ideology” and
“a fervent Communist...[who] never doubted the justice
of the cause.” Khrushchev instituted a series of re-
forms toward this end - including the period of de-
Stalinization. Notably, Khrushchev denounced the
“cult of personality,” the concept of idolizing a political
figure in the popular imagination in order to obfuscate
controversial (and usually brutal) policies. Under
Khrushchev’s watch, Soviet Russia charted a more
moderate (though still repressive) path.
One effect of de-Stalinization was a resulting
“cultural thaw.” By the mid-1950s, “many of the old
[artistic] restrictions were lifted, and every component
of Soviet culture benefited.” Kenez asserts that the new
society allowed Soviet intellectuals to “distinguish
between friends and foes of change.” As a result, “from
this time on...the Soviet Union ceased to be a totalitar-
ian society.”  Still, officially published and distributed9
       Kenez, 185.8
       Ibid, 191.9
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works were subject to government approval, and media
were always subject to the political whims of the
State.10
In an effort to showcase its post-Stalinist societal
transformation, the Kremlin hosted in 1957 the
Moscow Youth Festival. The State gathered tens of
thousands of teenagers from across the USSR and
invited musical acts from both sides of the Iron Cur-
tain to perform, including groups from Great Britain.
The British groups brought an array of unorthodox
instruments, including electric guitars. What they did
with them horrified the older generation in attendance,
but “the rock and roll numbers aroused great interest
among the youth of the socialist camp.”   This was not11
to be an isolated event but a vanguard of not only a
new era of popular electrified music, but a new era of
how the populace interacted with its government, and
each other. 
By the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s, public
demand for Western rock and roll music had spread.
Most of the music was illegal and not available for
purchase from official commercial venues. The youth
acquired the forbidden tunes anyway, mainly through
the emergence of domestic electrical technology that
allowed rock and roll music to be pirated and distrib-
uted ubiquitously throughout the USSR. This distribu-
tion of Western culture was itself illegal and thus an
act of protest, and the issue gained traction when
underground Soviet musicians began writing their own
songs using Russian lyrics and distributing that on
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the same networks, creating a collective acknowledge-
ment of status quo discontent. First on discarded x-ray
plates that doubled as second-hand ‘vinyl’ records
(known as “records on ribs” ), and then on tape12
recorders, this distribution was primarily possible
through magnitizdat; literally “tape-recorder culture.” 
The concept of magnitizdat illustrates beautifully
the democratizing effect that technology had upon the
Soviet masses. Specifically, the release of State-manu-
factured tape recorders starting in 1960 had hugely
significant and unintended consequences on the
nature of public communication. The machines
allowed the population to spread music and thus ideas
that were not officially sanctioned by the state censors.
The 128,000 recorders that appeared on the market in
1960 sold out quickly, and by the end of the decade,
sales numbered more than a million units per year.13
Party leaders and ideological censors seemed to have
no conception of the potential impact of the devices, or
how they would be used. 
As de-Stalinization continued into the late 1950s
and early 1960s, social criticism gained in both
popularity and government acceptance. Comedy clubs
featured acts satirizing the hubris of the contemporary
Soviet state, while young singer-songwriters performed
protest songs for groups of friends in private areas. A
prominent Eastern German musician, Wolf Biermann,
achieved exceptional notoriety with his sparse guitar
playing, catchy melodies and pointed, political lyrics.
Among others, artists such as Vladimir Vysotsky and
       Artemy Troitsky, Back in the USSR (London: Omnibus12
Press, 1987), 19.
       Ryback, 37.13
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Bulat Okudzhava also found success with similar
songs. Collectively, these musicians and the others
like them became known as the Bards of Discontent.  14
Bulat Okudzhava had direct experience with the
terrorism of the Stalin era. Though serving no time in
labor camps himself, “his father had been ‘liquidated’
by Stalin in 1937 and his mother banished to
Siberia.”  After Stalin’s death, many political prisoners15
had remained incarcerated for years, until by 1956 it
was “impossible to keep most political prisoners in the
camps any longer.” The Soviet population surely
noticed “the return of so many of Stalin’s victims,”
making “the Stalinist horrors visible to all.”  Perhaps16
this prisoner return influenced Bulat Okudzhava to
write and eventually become the first hero of the
magnitizdat.
Mr. Okudzhava began composing in the mid-1950s,
performing songs in his apartment for the enjoyment
of friends. At some point in the early sixties, an audi-
ence member with a Soviet-made tape recorder cap-
tured a typical performance, which included references
to love as well as criticism of the Stalinist years, two
taboo subjects. Almost overnight, two things exploded
in popularity: Bulat Okudzhava, and the concept of
trading in underground music. No longer “was the
music of the bards restricted to small groups of ten or
twenty people who gathered in private apartments.
Tapes with underground songs soon circulated by the
millions.”17
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Though the controversial subject matter of
Okudzhava’s songs surely drew interest in his mate-
rial, it may have been the very concept of sharing
officially unapproved ideas in a conspiratorial manner
that appealed to the population. Vladimir Frumkin, a
musician who graduated from the Leningrad Conser-
vatory of Music, describes the impact of Okudzhava as
larger than its content. Frumkin summarizes the
situation:
“Before Okudzhava, the Soviet song industry
had virtually no competition from within the
country. The state monopoly on songs seemed
unshakeable. Suddenly it was discovered that
one person could compose a song and make it
famous, without the Union of Soviet Composers,
with its creative sections and department of
propaganda, without help of popular singers,
choirs and orchestras, without publishing
houses, radio and television, film and record
companies, editors and censors.”18
Okudzhava proved that one person, with the right
message and the right means of spreading that mes-
sage, could profoundly impact the society in which he
or she lived. This smacked of individuality in the
rigidly collectivist USSR, and revealed that official
censorship could be undermined on a mass scale.
Magnitizdat listeners experienced more than music
on their pirated tapes. On a typical recording, “one
heard...the presence of the audience: chairs scraping
across the floor, a bottle knocking against glasses,
       Ryback, 45.18
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muted laughter or quiet applause.” Taken together
with the music and the illicit distribution methods,
and “legends emerged, faceless legends, recognizable
only by their voices, their music, and their lyrics.”  As19
Khrushchev called on the government to end the “cult
of personality” of political leaders, his population was
very much doing so on their own, forming an apprecia-
tion of their own heroes based solely on musical
message. Solidarity stemmed from the recorded,
audible evidence that across the country, other groups
of people were doing the exact same thing.
The magnitizdat acted like the Guttenberg printing
press, but better. Though Guttenberg’s machine
brought the written word to the poor masses, those
masses were still constrained by rampant illiteracy.
Everyone in the Soviet Union, however, had ears.
Whether Western rock music or songs from the Bards,
the Soviet-produced home tape recorders allowed
nearly anybody to pirate a song, re-distribute it, and
be exposed to the messages contained within. Music
was an ideal vehicle to spread non-Party approved
messages, because of the technological distribution
advantages of the time and context.
As outlined in Marx’s theory on the means of
production, the State owned the physical machinery
necessary to produce large amounts of cultural out-
put, which it could in turn use to propagate ideology.
It possessed such tools of cultural production in the
realms of cinema, literature, and official music. The
State officially owned the labor as well; in the field of
music, only those people who had studied at official
conservatory levels were approved to produce music,
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and only then under the strict boundaries of taste
dictated by the censors. With these appropriations, the
State felt it could dictate proper popular culture, and
thus control the entertainment arena’s impact upon
ideology.
The phenomenon of magnitizdat proved that
concept a fallacy. The public produced and listened to
the music it wanted to hear, despite and because of
the poor sound quality and illegal methods of acquire-
ment. As the classically-trained musician Vladimir
Frumkin asserts above, the government controlled the
officially trained writers, producers, editors, and
necessary equipment to produce top quality music.20
But people preferred the grainy tape recordings be-
cause content matters. Bulat Okudzhava, Vladimir
Vysotsky, Wolf Biermann and others sang about the
daily hardships of Soviet life, which resonated in a way
that the officially sanctioned, government-produced
music could not. 
Radio
“An emphasis on technical progress and
technical-scientific education was a main theme
of Communist Party propaganda since the first
days of Soviet history ...”21
Nearly all Western rock and roll music was im-
ported illegally into the Soviet Union. Some records
came with visiting Western students, or were brought
       Cushman, 40.20
       Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City (Baltimore:21
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 32.
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back by the very small number of Soviet citizens that
were allowed to travel abroad. However, a significant
amount of this music was imported from Western
radio stations.
Soon after the Cold War began, the United States
established radio stations in West Germany with the
explicit purpose of broadcasting information and
entertainment into the USSR. The station, Radio
Liberty, broadcast in Russian.  Interestingly, the West22
piggybacked on a technological innovation of the Soviet
Union. Soviet radio carried the unique distinction of
being broadcast almost entirely in shortwave fre-
quency, as opposed to the “medium wave (AM) or FM
broadcasts” that did not carry well over long distances.
Yale Richmond writes in Cultural Exchange and the
Cold War that the Russians themselves “pioneered
short-wave when Lenin used it in 1922 to address
listeners in the far corners of Russia.” Consequently,
“Soviet-produced radios, even inexpensive ones, had
shortwave bands.”  The West then took advantage of23
these shortwave capabilities to broadcast their own
content. In response, the Soviet government “built a
vast network of jammers...which made listening diffi-
cult.” Despite these efforts, Richmond could pick up
Western broadcasts even in the middle of Moscow,
where he spent “a tour of duty” from 1967-69. As he
puts it, “if a listener had a decent radio, knew some-
thing about antennas, and was determined to learn
A Policy of Rock 155
what was being said in the West, it was indeed possi-
ble to hear Western broadcasts despite the jamming.”24
Like Voice of America, Western programs from the
BBC, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Radio
Luxembourg contained similar content and were
likewise available to many Soviets, especially those in
the Eastern European bloc. In a country philosophi-
cally isolated by the Iron Curtain and physically
isolated by such barriers as the Berlin Wall and
intense travel restrictions, radio technology tran-
scended not only geography, but ideology as well.
Radio broke “the Soviet information monopoly” and
allowed “listeners to hear news and views that differed
from those of the Communist media.”  Many Soviet25
youth tuned into the Voice of America program for
rock and roll music, and stayed for Western news
analysis. 
Soviet Government pushed technological modernity
not only in its ideology, but in its education as well. An
“emphasis on technical progress and technical-scien-
tific education was a main theme of Communist Party
propaganda since the first days of Soviet history,”
resulting in “unforeseen results among Soviet youth.”
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, thousands of high-
school and college students designed and built their
own radio devices, with some students even broadcast-
ing their own radio shows.  The primary purpose of26
these home-made gadgets was to acquire and retrans-
mit Western music. Three college students arrested
and interrogated by the KGB in 1960 confessed that
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they recorded the popular music of capitalist countries
from the radio (presumably using State-manufactured
tape recorders!) and then re-broadcast them to local
audiences. According to the KGB report, “these stu-
dents not only listened to the Western radio stations
but also spread ‘anti-Soviet information’ among their
classmates.”  Undoubtably, these students acquired27
the technical skills required to build relatively ad-
vanced electronic devices because of the obsessive
focus in Soviet education on science and technology.
What was the appeal of Western music to the
Soviets? Memoirist David Gurevich describes growing
up in the Soviet Union and listening to rock music
with his friends on the “numerous radio stations like
Radio Luxembourg or the BBC” because “it was more
than a breath of fresh air - it was a hurricane, a
release, a true voice of freedom.” Gurevich recalls a
friend from school named Sergei, who “seemed to have
no life outside his legendary tape collection.” Noting
the meticulous arrangement of the collection, Gurevich
asks rhetorically “How much of it was an obsession
with music? With its message? Was the inaccessibility
of records and other rockabilia related to, perhaps,
some other emptiness in his life?”  The same question28
could be asked about many Soviet youth of the era. 
Like the ubiquity of the magnitizdat, the enormous
popularity of Western radio in the Soviet Union came
from two factors: natural curiosity about the forbidden
West, and the relatively easy access to information that
radio provided. Rock music was the ideal vehicle to
spread forbidden information because - as with the
A Policy of Rock 157
magnitizdat - one did not require expensive and illegal
cultural production equipment; just a radio. As
Gurevich notes, “you needed...some command of
English and the proper connections, to get a hold of
and read 1984. You needed friends in high places to
see Midnight Cowboy. But rock was readily available
from the numerous radio stations.”29
The ideological effects of Western rock and roll
music cannot be overstated. Yale Richmond, the
diplomat, reproduces an email he received from Serge
Levin, a Russian native who grew up in the 60s and
70s. Levin credits rock and roll as the “main factor
that brought down the Communist regime,” explaining
that
It was the cultural dynamite that blew up the
Iron Curtain. People were bringing Western
records from abroad, and they could be bought
on the black market...young people duplicated
those records like crazy. And I’m telling you, the
smell of freedom radiated by that music had a
profound impact on myself and thousands,
maybe millions of young people in my country.
Very few knew what the songs were about in
terms of lyrics, but everyone could feel the
energy and was able to figure it out by them-
selves. So the music was the main factor in
“Westernization” of the Russian people, at least
in my generation.30
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David Gurevich, for his part, did understand the lyrics,
and describes the effect that Bob Dylan (notable for his
unorthodox, nasally singing voice) had upon his
psyche. He recalls that he “would not accept for one
moment that you needed to be a musical genius in
order to stand up to the powers that be, to people who
think that their money or nationality or breeding or
just plain connections give them the right to look down
on you.”31
The 1970s: Brezhnev, VIA, and Time Machine
So now you consider us a bourgeois sell-
out...musicians, including rockers, need to
work professionally...professionalism is the
ability to achieve one’s desired results.
– Andrei Makarevich32
Vokal’no-instrumental’nyi ansambl’
Tired of his mercurial mood swings and unpredict-
able reform attempts, the party elites turned on
Khrushchev in 1964, and the political veteran Leonid
Brezhnev eventually came to replace him as the chief
authority in the Soviet Union. By the end of the 18-
year Brezhnev period, culminating with his death in
1982, Brezhnev and his administration were regarded
both domestically and internationally as aging and out
of touch with the modern world.33
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Brezhnev’s rule is characterized by economic
stagnation resulting from the difficulties of a central
planning approach toward an increasingly complicated
national economy, political corruption, and the end of
the utopian promise of Communism. The administra-
tion publicized Brezhnev’s tenure as “real, existing
socialism,” because, as Peter Kenez argues, “the new
leaders felt uncomfortable with a utopian ideology,
unconsciously realizing that the promise of a just and
affluent society in the distant future had outlived its
usefulness: people were tired of waiting.” Thus, the
Brezhnev “era was one of complacency and conserva-
tism.”34
These adjectives stood in sharp contrast from the
grandiose promises of Khruschev and even Stalin
concerning the development of high technology. Since
its inception, the Soviet Union had consistently guar-
anteed its citizens a quality of life to eventually exceed
that of the West. As late as the Khruschev era, Soviet
officials continued to insist that the technological gap
between Russia and the West was closing rapidly, as
evidenced by the 1959 launching of Sputnik satellite
(and the production of domestic technology, like tape
recorders). Yet, by the time of Brezhnev, “Soviet
citizens believed that absolutely everything made in
the West was superior to its domestic products” and
that “even simple Soviet citizens who fully accepted the
existing social and political order knew well that
people in the West enjoyed a much higher standard of
living.”  Though complacent and conservative, the35
government did not openly acknowledge any techno-
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logical gap between the societies, and increased its
attention toward controlling the ideological influences
that the Soviet population had access to. This includ-
ing reigning in increasingly popular home-grown (and
illegal) Soviet rock bands.
These bands were formed in the mold of popular
Western groups. The Beatles gained massive popular-
ity in 1964, and by 1966 over 250 rock bands had
formed in Moscow alone.  Reacting to the lack of36
access to quality musical equipment, rock musicians
typically assembled their own equipment and sound
systems with whatever equipment they could find,37
including components from public pay-phones that
they could use to convert acoustic guitars into electric
ones.  Highly desired Western instruments were38
available on the black market, albeit at exorbitantly
expensive prices; most rock bands could not afford
such equipment. Nevertheless, even with homemade
gear, the bands drew devoted followers.
In the late 1960s, the State took a new approach in
its attempts to counter the ideological difficulties
posed by the popularity of rock and roll. In 1966 “the
Ministry of Culture approved the formation of the first
state-supported beat-music ensembles,” entitled Vocal
Instrument Ensembles, or VIA’s.  Cushman describes39
the relationship as a Faustian bargain: “musicians
agreed to temper the content of their music - first and
foremost the lyrical content  - in return for access to the
means of cultural production and reproduction...and
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money.”  Artemy Troitsky describes VIA music as “a40
disciplined (or, to be frank, castrated) version of beat
music.”41
The VIA held two concurrent purposes: to drain the
ideological challenge of rock and roll by co-opting the
musical form to propagate pro-Soviet ideology. In
many cases, songs were written by the Union of Soviet
Composers. Common topics included “steel produc-
tion, grain harvests, and antifascist solidarity. One
popular song...was dedicated to the trans-Siberian
pipeline.”42
Why would underground rock bands compromise
their independent voice, which seems so at odds with
the original draw of rock and roll in the first place? On
one hand, some “amateur bands...had little need or
desire for official recognition...young people’s insatia-
ble hunger for live Western rock guaranteed full
houses; foreign radio broadcasts and black-market
recordings invigorated repertoires with fresh material
from the West.”  On the other, good equipment was43
expensive, and “amateur status meant you had to hold
a regular job and could only play in your space time.”44
Furthermore, “using worn out home-made equipment
and low quality instruments was both unaesthetic and
uncool. But Western equipment...was only available on
the black market...A Fender or Gibson electric guitar
went for three to five thousand roubles.”  State45
sponsorship allowed musicians access to superior
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Western equipment, the best State recording studios
available, official State venues, and media attention
through television and radio promotion. Not inciden-
tally, the job also paid extraordinarily well. Yuri Valov,
of the Moscow band Winds of Change, abandoned his
study of law when he realized he could make three
times more money as a VIA member than as a lawyer.
He then continued to play in the underground in his
spare time. In this way, he both earned an outstanding
living and retained some segment of individuality
through rock and roll.46
Herein lies the irony of Soviet VIAs. In the contin-
ued effort to control the ideological message expressed
in its culture, the Soviet Union bribed underground
bands to stop producing controversial material with
Western instruments and technology. Implicit then is
the acknowledgment by the State it could not match
the quality of Western goods, a self-defeating admis-
sion that belies the whole point of attacking the
subversive ideology of rock and roll in the first place. 
The Soviet population had long suspected that the
West was much more technologically advanced than
the USSR. With VIA, the State seemed to concede the
point as well.
Conclusion - Techno-Irony
“The West was inherently subversive, because
the vision of Western affluence undermined the
Soviet regime.”47
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During the period of de-Stalinization, in the years
1957-1964, Bards of Discontent, acting in the historic
tradition of the Russian guitar-bard, provided a
framework of individual expression and demonstrated
the cultural power of magnitizdat distribution. Then,
from the emergence of the Beatles in 1964, through
the early 1980s, millions of (mostly young) Soviets,
revolting against official rock bans and State dictums
on proper cultural consumption, grew addicted to the
culture of the West, primarily experienced through
underground rock and roll recordings. The effect was
to destabilize the Communist indoctrination of the
youth while simultaneously providing an alternative
area of collective focus.
The Soviet government aided in this process in a
physical way by distributing tape recorders, short-
wave state-manufactured radios, and Western musical
equipment. There is a key philosophical element in
play here, as well. Technological modernity is a central
tenet of Soviet ideology, first articulated by Lenin in
the early 1920s. This view, in turn, was drilled into
Soviet youth as part of their Communist indoctrina-
tion. As late as the early 1960s, the government
repeatedly promised that within a generation, the
Soviet Union would catch up to and surpass the
United States. Yet, they never did, and because of the
availability of Western culture, predominantly in the
form of music and radio broadcasts from abroad, every
Soviet citizen became aware by the 1970s of the vast
technological advantage of the West. The government
appeared to concede this point, if accidentally, in its
efforts to co-opt Western rock and roll by promoting
VIAs and supplying them with Western instruments
and equipment. Could it be that the Soviet population
20
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accepted the Communist premise that the key to a
modern, successful society was technological moder-
nity, and then grew to understand that the West had
achieved it first? I contend that the Soviet people,
exposed to Western culture with lots of inadvertent
help from the Soviet government itself, did just that.
Consequently, accepting that premise and realizing
that the Soviet standard of living was getting farther,
and not closer, to the bar set by the West, the Soviet
population understood that the Soviet system con-
tained a fatal flaw. They may not have know what
exactly it was, or why it existed, but at some point, the
Soviet population, with the help of rock and roll,
realized the ironic truth: the State had convinced them
that technological modernity was key to a successful
society, and the West had beaten them to it, handily.
Neal Albright is a graduating senior at Santa Clara
University.
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American Press Coverage of Genocide in
Cambodia: The “Ideological Blinders”
that Led to a Failure in Public Responsi-
bility
Amelia Evans
The overthrow of longtime authoritarian ruler
Hosni Mubarak in Egypt has already been distin-
guished as 2011’s political event to remember.  Ameri-
cans watched, on the edge of their seats, as events
unfolded in Cairo.  Faced with the censorship of the
print press, Egyptian protestors spread their message
through social networking sites like Facebook and
Twitter.  The Egyptian government’s attempts to shut
down the Internet in Egypt proved fruitless—too much
information had already flooded the nation.  In a post-
9/11 world, Americans are more concerned than ever
about the state of the Middle East, and have depended
on the media to keep them informed.  Revolutionized
by the worldwide expansion of the Internet, the media
now have a greater, and less regulated stake than ever
in matters of national security.  The media have always
played a key role in the functioning of American
democracy, carrying the responsibility to not only
inform the public, but to also keep the government in
check by serving as a “watchdog.”  The traditional
American press, however, has failed to fulfill its
responsibilities at some critical points in history.  In
one particularly egregious case, that press failed to
investigate one of the worst instances of genocide since
the Holocaust.
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